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The customizable area whole farm insurance (CAWFI) is proposed and evaluated
as a possible whole-farm revenue protection design for crop farms. The evaluation
included assessing appropriate weight, optimal scale, and optimal coverage level. The
optimal CAWFI was tested against no insurance program, 90% farm level whole farm
insurance (90% CFWFI), and CAWFI with scale and coverage level as provisioned in
GRP product (restricted CAWFI) in representative farm in Kansas, North Dakota,
Illinois, and Mississippi.
The study finds the optimal CAWFI outperforms no insurance program and
restricted CAWFI asserting that CAWFI is a workable insurance model and relaxing
restriction on scale and coverage level can increase expected utility of farmers. The
optimal CAWFI results in a risk reduction roughly equal with 90% farm-level wholefarm insurance though the expected indemnities in it are at least three fold.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Background
Farmers are simultaneously confronted with multiple sources of risks. One source
of risk is yield risk, which is affected by adverse weather and disease or a farmer’s own
management practices. Another major source of risk is market price variation, which is
driven by the global market. To stabilize farm revenue even in harsh, risky environments,
farmers adopt various strategies, including crop insurance, forward pricing, and
participation in government price support programs.
Crop insurance is one form of risk transfer, exchanging a sure premium for an
indemnity paid when negative outcomes occur. There are several reasons that make
developing an agricultural insurance product challenging. Most agricultural producers in
the same region are exposed to losses or gains at the same time because of correlated
systemic risks. All farms of a particular region may suffer the same type of yield losses
because of devastating weather, such as torrential rain, cyclones, droughts, excessively
low or high temperatures, etc. The catastrophic loss in a large geographic region is known
as systemic risk, which may lead to market failure (Miranda and Glauber, 1997). Thus,
insurers need relatively large capital reserves and/or reinsurance to backstop their risk
exposure. Adverse selection and moral hazard are two other major problems in
1
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developing a crop insurance product because of the hidden information and hidden
behavior of the insured farmers. Therefore, a premium price of insurance consists of risk
cost, which is the cost for the pure risk associated with the venture, administrative cost,
which is a cost for informational control and service delivery, and the reserve-stock cost,
i.e., an insurer would have sufficient reserves capable of paying off indemnity at all times
(Skees et al. 2008). The US government offers yield insurance based on actual production
history (APH) yield, area based insurance, revenue insurance, and more recently the
whole farm insurance products.
In discussions of alternative risk protection programs, policy makers and farmers
are sometimes attracted to the whole farm insurance concept because whole farm
insurance can pool all price and yield risks of a farm into a single insurance policy and
can provide insurance more cheaply as compared to commodity-specific revenue
insurance or any individual price and/or farm-level yield insurance products. This is
because of the diversification effect, i.e. different crop revenues being less than perfectly
correlated with each other. However, one should note that Adjusted Gross Revenue
(AGR) and AGR-lite are two whole farm insurance products already offered by Risk
Management Agency (RMA). The AGR program has not been popular. It is based on the
income tax schedule F form, which may not accurately represent the farm income. It is
also complex in part because the need to make accrual adjustments to a schedule F based
on cash accounting. The AGR program is inherently confronted with balancing the
choice of very stringent underwriting rules to prevent fraud and abuse or an operationally
simple program that will likely reward gamesmanship rather than good farming practices
(i.e., more prone to adverse selection and moral hazard problems of farmers). Another
2
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issue with farm-level whole farm insurance is that the need to understand price
variability, yield variability, and price-yield interactions for all the commodities grown
on a farm makes developing insurance complex and opens up the potential for adverse
selections due to inaccurate rating assumptions (Dismukes and Coble, 2006). However,
another potential motivation for whole farm insurance designs is that whole farm
insurance can potentially qualify as WTO-compliant up to a 70 percent coverage level
(Coble and Miller, 2006).
Group Risk Protection (GRP) and Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) are areabased insurance products that provide commodity-specific indemnity based on county
yield/revenue shortfalls. The two major insurability problems of crop insurance, adverse
selection and moral hazard, can be minimized through area-based insurance because
individual farmers neither have better access to aggregated county data as compared to
insurers nor may they influence county average through his/her individual behavior
(Miranda, 1991). As the county yield is not perfectly correlated with the farm yield, areabased insurance products are subject to basis risk. As a result, there would be chances of
getting indemnity if the farmer doesn’t suffer from losses and also a chance of not
receiving any indemnity if the farmer faces losses (Barnett et al. 2005, Deng, Barnett, and
Vedenov, 2007).
In addition to crop insurance products, price/income risk protection was provided
through the commodity title of farm bill through loan programs, deficiency payments,
and more recently the counter cyclical program, which were introduced by legislation.
The Supplemental Revenue (SURE) and Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) are
two other programs provisioned through the 2008 Farm Bill. SURE is based on revenue
3
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losses and would provide compensation based on whole farm revenue shortfalls,
including all crops produced on the farm to the farmers of disaster-declared counties. The
total farm revenue under SURE payment is personal farm revenue plus any other
payment received from any price/income support programs or indemnity received from
any insurance program (FSA/USDA, 2011). The ACRE program pays indemnity based
on state revenue shortfalls. Critics believe that the price support programs provide little
support to crop yield losses due to bad weather. Then Chairman of House Agriculture
Committee Collin Peterson mentioned that a more flexible whole farm revenue concept
might be considered a better farm program relative to ACRE (Abbott, 2010). The ACRE
program is also linked with crop insurance products (Cooper, 2010). Thus, some of these
insurance products and Farm Bill programs appear redundant with each other they all
protect against revenue risk (Anderson, Barnett, and Coble 2009). In practice, these
price/income support and farm support programs are offered simultaneously with crop
insurance products. The inclusion of these farm programs and insurance products
together would mix up the effects of one program with other programs as a result it
would be difficult to specify the individual program effect. This study focuses on wholefarm area insurance and attempts to design a program that best reduces farm revenue risk
in an actuarially-fair context. While Customizable Area Whole Farm Insurance (CAWFI)
would likely be provided in addition to other programs, these other price/income support
and farm bill programs are omitted to focus on the actual risk reduction achieved by the
newly proposed model.

4
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Problem Statement
Area-based insurance products are exposed to basis risk that does not exist in
farm-level products, but these farm-level products are more affected by moral hazard and
adverse selection problems. Whole farm insurance can protect risks associated with
multiple commodities at a lower premium than insuring each commodity separately, but
whole farm insurance requires complex premium ratings and indemnity calculations. A
trade off exists in farm-level and area-based products. Therefore, a hybrid between farmbased and area-based products that could customize area insurance to a specific farm
might be considered a better crop insurance program if it could be developed.
This thesis posits a new approach to whole farm insurance. This approach would
use area revenue as a trigger that could preclude many of the fraud and record keeping
challenges of the current AGR program. However, whole farm insurance based on a
county revenue trigger cannot cover some farm revenue shortfalls because of a lack of
perfect correlation of aggregated revenue and the farm revenue. This is an issue that
needs to be considered carefully, so that the appropriate weighting scheme is selected.
One could simply use the sum of aggregated commodity revenue by county. However,
this would implicitly weight all commodities by the crop mix of the county. A farm
growing a different crop mix could potentially receive poor risk protection due to the lack
of correlation between farm and county crop mix.
The linear response of county yield from its mean to the farm yield from its mean
is considered as a scale, and used in an area yield GRP product imposing certain
restriction on scale. The scale and coverage level in GRP has also been partially
compensating each other when one of those is restricted (Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov,
5
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2007). The existing literature examining the optimal scale and coverage level in yield
index-based insurance does not consider either a single crop or multi-crop area revenue
design. This study contributes to existing literature by taking into account a single-crop as
well as multi-crop area revenue design and estimates optimal scale and coverage level
along with appropriate weighting mechanism in the proposed model.
Hence, a customizable area revenue whole farm insurance model (CAWFI) was
designed. The expectation in designing CAWFI is to incorporate the risk-reducing
properties of whole farm insurance into the area-based insurance product that could
minimize adverse selection and moral hazard problems as well as the complexities of
premium ratings and indemnities calculations. Therefore, a weighting mechanism along
with optimal scale and optimal coverage level seems necessary to customize the area crop
mix to the farm crop mix.

6
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Objectives
The general objective of this research is to develop and evaluate a customizable
area whole farm insurance simulation model that can evaluate the cost and benefits of
whole farm risk protection designs based on both farm and area revenue measures.
Specific objectives are:
•

Develop a simulation model capable of modeling correlated prices and yields with
mixed marginal distributions of both farm and area revenue protection for
representative farms in four diverse production regions.

•

Develop the CAWFI design and evaluate optimal weights scale and coverage
level to maximize producer risk reduction with CAWFI.

•

Compare optimal CAWFI with the restricted CAWFI i.e. CAWFI model where
scale and coverage level would be as provisioned in GRP.

•

Compute and compare farmers’ benefit of CAWFI versus whole farm insurance
based on farm level yield (CFWFI).

7
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

The US Congress first authorized Federal Crop Insurance in 1930, and the Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) was formed to carry out delivery of the crop
insurance programs in 1938 (RMA/USDA, 2008). Prior to 1980, the crop insurance
program was limited to major crops and specific regions of the country. The Crop
Insurance Act of 1980 expanded the program to many more crops and regions of the
country and began premium subsidy provision up to 30%. Due to these actions, the
participation in the crop insurance program increased, but still it did not achieve the
participation that Congress had expected. Government subsidy on crop insurance
program influences production decisions of farmers and prices of the commodity (Young
et al, 2001). Congress continued funding the Federal Crop Insurance program while also
simultaneously passing frequent ad hoc disaster bills though both programs compensated
for yield losses. Per the 1994 Crop Insurance Act, Catastrophic (CAT) coverage was
made mandatory to the farmers to be eligible for ad hoc disaster payments. In 1996, the
Risk Management Agency (RMA) was created to administer FCIC programs, and it
repealed the mandatory CAT coverage participation but catastrophic coverage remained
highly subsidized. The acreage insured reached 180 million in 1998. That was three fold
the acreage insured in 1988 and more than double the acreage insured in 1993. In 2000,
8
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crop insurance was available on 88 crops. In the same year, Congress authorized the
private sector’s participation in crop insurance research and development. Premium
subsidies on higher coverage levels were increased to encourage purchasing higher
insurance coverage levels (RMA/USDA, 2008).
Figure 1 shows various US farm support and crop insurance programs introduced
since 1930 and still in place today. Ad hoc programs are also continuing side by side
since then to date.

Year
Crop Insurance + Ad hoc Programs

1930
Yield
based
Insurance
products (
Multiple
Peril Crop
Insurance
and Actual
Production
History
:MPCI,
APH)

Price/Income
Support
Programs
(Loan
Programs,
Deficiency
Payments,
Counter
Cyclical
Payments:
LP, DP, CCP)

1993
Area
Based
Insurance
Products
(Group
Risk
protection
and Group
Risk
Income
Protection:
GRP,
GRIP)

1996

Revenue
Insurance
Products
(Crop
Revenue
Coverage,
Income
Protection,
and
Revenue
Assurance:
IP, CRC,
RA)

2000
Whole
Farm
Insurance
Products
(Adjusted
Gross
Revenue:
AGR and
AGRLite)

2011

2008
Farm Bill
(SURE,ACRE)

Figure 1
History of Crop Insurance and Farm Support Programs in the United States
9
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Prior to 1996, the yield-based crop insurance program and ad hoc disaster
payment protected yield risk. Since 1930, price risk protection was provided through loan
programs (LP), deficiency payments (DP), and more recently the counter-cyclical
program (CCP) and ACRE program. The crop yield insurance gradually moved towards
area yield, area revenue and farm level commodity specific revenue insurance, and most
recently towards the farm level whole farm insurance.
Different crop insurance products and simulation technique used in agricultural
economics research are reviewed in detail under the following two subheadings of the
literature review.
a. Crop Insurance Programs
b. Simulation Methods

Crop Insurance Programs
Crop insurance in the US began with the yield insurance program. The Actual
Production History (APH) insurance and Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) programs
are based on APH yield, which is a simple average of four to ten years of historic yield of
a farm. The APH yield also suffers from sampling errors, and being yield insurance, it
cannot cover price risk. The commodity specific revenue insurance products protect price
as well as yield risk of crops in the farm. The premium cost for the whole farm insurance
is much cheaper compared to summing up the individual crop revenue insurance in a
farm, but the whole farm insurance products have complexities in designing premium
ratings and indemnity claims due to inaccurate assumptions that open up the chance of
asymmetric information. Whole farm insurance incurs huge costs to maintain farm-level
10
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data, which raises the transaction costs. The area-based products like GRP and GRIP are
less prone to problems of asymmetric information and also can reduce the transaction
costs, but because of the imperfect correlation of farm yield to area yield, these areabased products are exposed to higher basis risk. The following sections contain detailed
discussions about each of these insurance products.

Yield Insurance
Until 1995, all agriculture insurance products were yield based and crop-specific,
and would provide compensation based on individual crop yield losses. Actual
production history (APH) is the modern version of yield insurance in the United States.
Expected yields are based on the farmer’s crop-yield records over multiple years, and
FCIP uses those records in its crop insurance program to determine normal production
levels for a farmer. MPCI uses the APH yield to estimate the indemnity that is driven by
yield shortfalls. MPCI is one of the dominant yield insurance products that protect
insured farmers’ yield loss caused by multiple perils, such as rainfall, disease, and
droughts. The major drawback of this product is that the exact cause of loss is not always
identified, which is problematic to the insurers. Those multiple perils are also spatially
correlated. As a result, the cost of MPCI may challenge the financial reserves of a private
insurer in a year where many insured simultaneously make a claim (Skees et al. 2008).
MPCI benefits may vary sharply among farms, crops, and regions (Knight and Coble,
1997). Because the APH yield is based on four to ten years of historical average yield, it
suffers from sampling error. This sampling error in APH yield could potentially reduce

11
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farmers’ welfare at varying magnitudes across crops and geographical regions (Adhikari
et. al. 2010).

Area-Based Insurance
In 1993, the USDA first offered an area yield insurance product, the Group Risk
Protection (GRP), where the indemnity is paid to all the insured farmers of the county
based on county average yield shortfalls. Later in 2000, the area revenue based product
group risk income protection (GRIP) was introduced. GRIP pays indemnity based on
county revenue rather than county yield. The two major insurability problems of crop
insurance, adverse selection and moral hazard, can be minimized through area yield
insurance as it is advantageous over crop insurance products, which are based on
individual farm yield (Miranda, 1991). The basis risk that occurs here is from the
measure of correlation between farm and county yield. The higher the positive correlation
between the farm and county yield will lower the basis risks. As the county average yield
is not perfectly correlated with the area average yield, GRP is subject to basis risk
(Barnett et al.2005, Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov, 2007); as a result, farmers are unable to
protect their farm losses all the time.
GRP has less moral hazard problems and lower transaction costs as it avoids
establishing APH yields and on-farm loss adjustment. For some crops and in some
regions, GRP can perform better in homogenous as well as heterogeneous production
regions relative to MPCI (Barnett et. al. 2005). In 2005, approximately 76% of total
Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) acres were for farm-level yield and revenue
insurance products. The area-based insurance products have grown by 6% and have
12
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reached to 9% of FCIP in 2005, compared to 3% of FCIP in 2002. Area insurance could
become an available alternative insurance product instead of farm-level insurance even in
heterogeneous geographical production regions when premium rates for farm-level
insurance contain large positive wedges, where the wedge is defined as the gap between
insurance premium cost and expected indemnity of the insurance product (Deng, Barnett,
and Vedenov, 2007). In FCIP, premium rates are designed to have negative wedges
because government pays administrative and operating costs and also subsidizes the
premium.
The Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) is an area-revenue product, introduced
in 2000. National price, county-level yields, and farm-level acreage are used to calculate
GRIP where the indemnity is paid to all the farmers of the county based on county
average revenue shortfalls. The GRIP policies are based on futures prices and county
average yields rather than individual farm yields (Edwards, 2009). Paulson and Babcock
(2008) illustrate that although the ad hoc disaster-assistance program may not be
perfectly substituted by GRIP, as GRIP covers price as well as yield risk, it could be
financed from the Farm Bill program or Crop Insurance program savings. GRIP did not
become popular, and the acres insured under it consisted of 3.5% of revenue insured
acres in 2005 (Coble and Miller, 2006). Dismukes and Glauber (2004) speculated that if
GRIP is strengthened to substitute for the ad hoc disaster program, the premium subsidy
to buy up level coverage would be more costly.

13
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Commodity-Specific Revenue Insurance
In 1996, two crop revenue insurance programs, Income Protection (IP) and Crop
Revenue Coverage (CRC), were introduced in limited areas for specific crops. In the next
year, Revenue Assurance (RA) was added as a third crop revenue product. These revenue
insurance programs guarantee a certain level of farm revenue for a given crop rather than
just production and pay an indemnity if revenues fall beneath the guarantee. As this
indemnity payment scheme deals with both price and yield risk, it is supposed to be
highly correlated with a farm’s need (Zhu et al., 2008). Crop revenue products rapidly
became popular among farmers as they protect from price as well as yield shortfalls. In
crop year 2001, FCIC acreage under revenue insurance reached 58% of total crop
insurance premium. Revenue insurance represented 60% of total crop insurance premium
in 2003, which was 55% of that year’s total crop insured acres (RMA/USDA, 2004). For
the crop years 1999 and 2000, Congress increased the premium subsidy and passed the
Agricultural Risk Protection Act 2000. As a result, the overall participation in crop
insurance programs increased by 20% from 1998 to 2003 (Glauber, 2004). Coble et al.
(2000) discussed revenue insurance products substitute for other risk-reducing strategies
such as futures hedging and option. This effect increases rapidly beyond 70% coverage
level, i.e., higher insurance coverage level would lead to lower optimal hedge.
Assuming farm family utility is the function of initial wealth and variability of
wealth across all risky enterprises, single revenue insurance products provide risk
protection at a lower cost than separate price and yield risk protection programs in
perfectly competitive markets. Single revenue insurance products protect farmers against
revenue variability. The commodity-level crop revenue protects against individual crop
14
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revenue, and the premium is subsidized through FCIC (Monke and Durst, 2000). The
revenue variability occurs due to variation in price, yield, or interaction of both. The price
is determined mostly by world markets, and the yield is based on micro climatic factors,
so farm revenue tends to be highly responsive to fluctuations in farm yield. In some crops
and regions, the relation between price and yield is negative, which makes revenue less
variable, maintaining a natural hedge. All else equal, a more negative correlation between
price and yield reduces revenue risk. Thus, the revenue insurance meets the farmer’s
needs, and it is relatively cheap as compared to yield insurance. Therefore, in the areas of
more negative price-yield correlation with low yield variability (also known as low risk
area) where revenue insurance premium is lower, farmers have rapidly adopted revenue
insurance. This is especially true in the Midwestern corn and soybeans farms (Dismukes
and Coble, 2006).
According to Dismukes and Coble (2006), acres insured in revenue insurance
were 57% of total FCIC insured acres in 2006 consisting of three quarters of all insured
acres of the top three crops: corn, soybean, and wheat. FCIC encouraged farmers to buy
up level coverage increasing premium subsidies for higher coverage levels especially in
revenue insurance. Dismukes and Coble further discuss that because of the increment of
the 30% premium subsidy to 56%, half of the insured acres of 70% or higher coverage
level in 1999 reached to two thirds in 2002 where most producers had purchased
insurance coverage between 70 and 75%.
Mishra and Goodwin (2006) point out that the revenue insurance can shift
taxpayer’s burdens to subsidize farmers’ insurance premiums more efficiently. While the
experienced and resourceful farmers are less likely to purchase revenue insurance
15
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compared to new and resource-poor farmers. The total sum of commodity specific
revenue insurance premiums for a farm is a good deal higher than the estimated proposed
single whole farm insurance product of a farm, and insurance premium is sensitive to
price volatility and commodity mix (Hart et al., 2006). In other words, at the same
coverage level, summation of crop-specific insurance premium is more expensive than a
single whole farm insurance premium (Zhu et al., 2008.; Stokes et al., 1997).

Whole Farm Insurance
In 2000, whole farm insurance based on farm-level yield referred to as, Adjusted
Gross Revenue (AGR) was also introduced. AGR covers risks of all the commodities
grown in a farm in single insurance policy. Whole farm revenue insurance is more
efficient than the summation of commodity-specific revenue insurance (Stokes et al.,
1997). Whole-farm insurance pools all of a farm’s insurance risks into a single insurance
policy that provides cheaper premium rate at the same coverage level against the gross
farm revenue. Whole farm insurance is superior to crop-specific insurance as it takes care
of whole farm revenue risk at a low premium cost. For instance, Zhu et al. (2008)
mentions a 36% less insurance premium in whole farm insurance as compared with
commodity-specific revenue insurance products.
The price, yield, and price-yield interaction of all the commodities grown in a
farm are covered in a single insurance policy, which makes complex to design insurance
premium. It is also very difficult to verify revenue losses and indemnity payments. Both
AGR and AGR-lite use the income tax schedule, which may not reflect underlying
revenue risk, making whole farm insurance products unpopular. In the case of multiple16
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year income declines, neither commodity revenue nor whole farm revenue covers the risk
(Dismukes and Coble, 2006). Coble and Miller (2006) also mention that the use of
income tax forms as a starting point for farm revenue calculation is a major cause of
AGR being unpopular among farmers because income tax forms vary from the farmer’s
actual annual income, as farmers typically use cash accounting rather than accrual
accounting. They further mention that the AGR and AGR-lite combined had 3.53%
market share in 2005.The whole farm insurance up to 70% coverage level falls under
WTO Amber box, and hence, it is WTO-compliant, too (Coble and Miller, 2006).

Simulation Method
The practice of using simulation tools to deal with agricultural risk management is
increasing (Richardson et al., 2000). Typically, historical multivariate simulation has
most often been performed by assuming multivariate normality. However, imposing
normality on the marginal distribution of crop yields and prices is often not supported by
empirical data (Harri, Erdem, Coble, and Knight, 2009). The different marginal price
distributions are correlated with each other, and marginal yield distributions are also
potentially correlated. The interaction between price and yield has also been noted. Only
by using a procedure capable of modeling and simulating multivariate distributions can
one analyze such complex combinations (Ramirez, 2000). Ramirez further mentions that,
in general, both the mean and the variance of the marginal distributions of crop
productions and prices are found to be shifting over time. As all the crops grown in a
region are affected simultaneously through disease, pest, and/or weather, the nonnormally distributed yield has been found to often appear skewed to the left. On the other
17
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hand, price data tends to be auto-correlated over time, and non-normally distributed leftskewed yield may cause price to be right-skewed through market equilibrium. Marginal
price distributions are typically correlated with each other because crop production is
typically correlated and many crops also substitute for each other in output markets.

IC (1982) and PQH (2004) Methods
In practice, the Iman and Conover (IC) (1982) procedure is commonly used in
agricultural risk simulation in agricultural economics research (Mildenhall, 2005). The
Phoon, Quek, and Huang (PQH) (2004) procedure has also been used in agricultural
economics. The PQH is a multivariate simulation procedure for correlated stochastic
variables from mixed marginal distribution based on Eigen decomposition of a rank
correlation matrix.
Anderson, Harri, and Coble (2009) compared these two simulation procedures.
Compared with the popular IC simulation procedure, the PQH procedure is
straightforward and distribution free. Their study revealed that the IC simulation
procedure produces significantly different crop insurance premium rates relative to PQH
simulation procedures. The PQH procedure also produces a more accurate relationship
between interdependent random variables, as the t-test for rank correlation matrix from
simulated data does not differ significantly to that of the original correlation. Though the
mean squared error (MSE) of the correlation coefficient for small samples is relatively
higher in PQH simulation, it can be corrected by increasing sample size. The PQH
simulated data has relatively small bias. As the IC procedure produces biased estimates of
correlation between simulated variables, the PQH was found more accurate compared to
18
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the IC procedure. However, PQH is likely to produce more outliers than IC. PQH is well
suited for multi-crop insurance modeling because researchers can easily obtain more
accurate rates. Further, they suggest that multivariate simulation from mixed marginal
distribution is essential to analyze the revenue counter cyclical program provisioned in
the 2008 Farm Bill and a whole-farm disaster compensation program.

19
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Risk Aversion Behavior
People’s response varies towards risk environments. Some people are willing to
take risks, i.e., they love to play with risk thus displaying risk-loving behavior. For these
individuals, the utility function of wealth is convex to the origin. The more convex the
curvatures, the more risk-loving the individuals are. People who do not care about risk
while making decisions are called risk neutral. These people face the straight line utility
function of wealth. The behavior of an individual response towards risk is described in
Figure 2.
A person who always refuses a fair bet is risk averse. Likewise, people who prefer
certainty and dislike gambles are described as risk averse. These risk-averse individuals
face the concave utility function of wealth and are willing to pay some amount of
premium to get rid of a risky venture, as shown in Figure 2. A more concave curvature
indicates a more risk averse behavior, and a curvature close to a straight line indicates
less risk averse decision maker.
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Risk aversion

Risk Neutral

Utility
Risk loving

U(0)

Wealth

Figure 2
Risk Behavior of an Individual

Expected Utility Model
The expected utility hypothesis says that risk-averse decision makers make
decisions based on the expected utility from the gamble (Chavas, 2004: 21-30). Let a
decision maker have utility function U(z), with two possible outcomes z1 and z2 with
some probability, then this risk-averse decision maker’s objective function is to maximize
the expected utility. The expected utility, certainty equivalents, and insurance premiums
are key concepts in this model, which is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 also demonstrates the concept of how the expected utility model works.
Utility
U(z2)

E(u)=
u(CE)

E(u)=π*U(z1)+(1-π)*U(z2)

1

U(z1)

Z1

(Probability)

CE

E(z)

Z2

Figure 3
Expected Utility Model

Expected Utility
The utility of an uncertain prospect is its expected utility. In Figure 3, in a
hypothetical example, the expected utility is E(u). The player who is taking part in a
gamble asks if a sum of money is equivalent to a risky venture if it derives the same
expected utility as the non-risky venture. The expected utility from this gamble is the
probability weighted average of the utility of the two possible outcomes. If the gamble
has equal chance of winning and losing, then the average is halfway between the
22
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individual’s utility from wining and losing. This simple example illustrates the expected
utility derived from a bivariate discrete outcome event. However, in the case of a
continuous distribution, to estimate the expected utility, the PDF is multiplied by the
assumed utility function.

Certainty Equivalent
The certainty equivalent of a risky venture is the sure amount of money that if
received would have a utility equal to expected utility. Certainty equivalent (CE) is a
definite amount of return from a risky venture. Once, expected utility is estimated, then it
can be converted to the income i.e. certainty income for that venture. The CE in Figure 3
is certainty equivalent from the risky venture. An individual wants to take the amount
equivalent to CE rather than taking part of gamble, but he/she becomes ready to play
gamble below the income of CE.

Risk Premium
A risk premium is the minimum amount of money by which the expected return
of the risky venture must exceed the known or the risk-free venture in order to induce an
individual to hold the risky venture rather than the risk-free venture. If there is an
opportunity to avoid risk, a risk-averse individual is willing to pay some sort of amount.
The amount is the difference between expected value of possible outcomes and certainty
equivalent for the outcome. In the above example, this individual is willing to pay not to
take part in this gamble, i.e., insurance premium is positive and decision maker is risk
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averse. For a risk-neutral individual, premium would be zero, and for a risk-loving
individual, premium would be negative.
In this figure, an event has π probability of obtaining z1 outcome that provides
utility U (z1) while there is another event with a (1- π) probability to obtain z2 outcomes
that will provides utility U (z2).
The expected value of outcome is
(1) E ( z ) = π * z1 + (1 − π ) * z2
This expected outcome provides utility is U [ E ( z )]
While the expected utility for the outcome is
(2) E (u ) = U ( z1 )* π + U ( z2 )*(1 − π )
In Figure 3, the difference between expected wealth and the certainty equivalent
is indicated by the horizontal arrow. A risk-averse decision maker’s expected utility is
always lower than the utility of the expected outcome. Or in other words, we can express
as:
(3) U [ E ( z )] > E (u )
While making decisions under uncertain circumstances, decision makers make
decisions based on their expected utility rather than the utility of the expected outcome.

Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) Utility Function
CRRA is a risk preference theory where downside risks are given higher weight
than upside risks. CRRA gives greater weight to downside risk as compared to upside
risk (Chavas, 2004: 31-51).
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The CRRA function explains that proportionate increase in initial wealth would
permit to increase in the same proportionate increment in risk. The risk aversion
coefficient of 0.5 in CRRA indicates hardly risk averse at all; 1 indicates somewhat risk
averse (normal); 2.0 indicates rather risk averse (moderately risk averse); 3.0 indicates
very risk averse; and 4.0 indicates extremely risk averse. The CRRA function has a
problem with a 4 or higher level risk aversion coefficient, implying very high marginal
utility for low values of wealth with a sharp fall to give essentially zero marginal utility
for higher values. A risk-aversion level above 5 is perceived to be unrealistically risk
averse (Hardakar et al., 2004: 92-120).
Risk averse farmers will have a decreasing marginal utility over the amount of
pay off. This study makes assumption that decision makers maximize a constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) utility function of wealth. Consider a farm where there are two
crops 1 and 2, risk aversion coefficient r, weighted probability to possible outcome t is

ϖ t then, expression for net return, utility, and expected utility can be written as
(4) NRt = ϖ 1 NR1t + ϖ 2 NR2t
where
Wt = Wo + NRt
Wo =initial wealth
Wt =terminal wealth
And NRt = net return from different scenarios which are stochastic.
(5) U =

Wt1−r
if r≠ 1 and U = ln(Wt ) if r =1.
1− r
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The farmer’s expected utility is

Wt1−r
(6) E (U ) = ∑η t
1− r
t =1
n

if r≠1

n

and

E (U ) = ∑η t ln (Wt ) if r=1.
t =1

where η is the weight assigned based on probability to possible outcome t.

CAWFI Model

The actual farm revenue based on planted acres under CAWFI is the same as it
appears under whole farm insurance computation except that the CAWFI replaces farm
yield with county level yield. The expression to estimate CAWFI actual farm revenue is
(7) CAWFI Re v = ∑ Ai , f × Pi × Yi ,c
i

Where CAWFI Re v is actual farm revenue under CAWFI.
Ai , f is planted acres of crop i, on farm f;

Pi is output price of crop i,
Yi ,c is output quantity per acre of crop i, in county c.

Guaranteed revenue under CAWFI is estimated as;
(8) CAWFI Guar = E (CAWFI Re v ) * CL
Expectation of price and expectation of county yield are used to determine
expected revenue under CAWFI, which are also customized by appropriate weight.
Therefore, this equation can be extended as
(9) CAWFI Guar = ∑iµ i , f × E (Pi ) × E (Yi ,c ) × CL
26

Template Created By: Damen Peterson 2009
Where
CAWFI Guar = guaranteed revenue under CAWFI.

µ i, f = appropriate weight for the planted acres of crops i, in the farm f,
CL = coverage level,
E (Pi ) = expected output price for crop i,
E (Yi ,c ) = expected output of crop i in county c.

The equation used by Skees, Black, and Barnett (1997) to estimate indemnity
payout for area yield product GRP is
 GRPGuar − GRPYield 

(10) GRPINDEM = Max 
 ( E (GRPYield )( scale ) , 0 
GRPGuar




Where GRPGuar is critical area yield in GRP
GRPYield is area yield in GRP
E (GRPYield ) is insurer’s forecast of the area yield in GRP.
In the GRP model, farmers are restricted to a scale ranging from 0.9 to 1.5 and
allowed to select a different scale at that range and are also allowed to select different
coverage levels ranging from 0.70 to 0.90. Scale is a multiplier that adjusts the magnitude
of the indemnity. The optimal scale in this equation is derived as β1 from the following
equation,
(11) yi = β 0 + β1 ( yc − E ( yc )) + ε i
Where yi is the county yield for crop i,
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E ( yc ) is expected county yield for the same crop i,

ε i is the error term.
The indemnity is paid only when, y < yc .
The above equations are used here with some extensions. Basically, CAWFI
replaces the area yield by area revenue. The indemnity under CAWFI is paid only when
CAWFI revenue falls below the guaranteed CAWFI revenue, otherwise indemnity paid
would be zero. The equation to estimate indemnity is
(12) CAWFI INDEM = Max[{

CAWFI Guar − CAWFI Re v
}( ECAWFI Re v )( Scale),0]
CAWFI Guar

Where, CAWFIINDEM is indemnity under CAWFI model.
The optimal scale is obtained as a beta coefficient, which is a response of county
revenue deviation from its mean to farm revenue deviation from its mean. This beta
coefficient measures the linear relationship between the county revenue and farm
revenue. The error term reflects the idiosyncratic (basis) risk associated with this farm’s
revenue variability. The scale in the form of β1 is estimated from the following equation
(13) CFWFI Re v − E (CFWFI Re v ) = β1 (CAWFI Re v − E (CAWFI Re v )) + ε i
where
CFWFI Rev is the revenue under whole farm insurance based on farm level yield
E (CAWFI Re v ) is the expected revenue in CAWFI from multiple crops.
E (CFWFI Re v ) is the expectation of revenue in the farm level.
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Whole Farm Insurance Based on Farm Level Yield (CFWFI) Model

To evaluate the performance of CAWFI, a hypothetical farm-level whole farm
policy is also modeled. Farmers are assumed to have the option to buy whole farm
insurance based on farm-level yield. The actual farm revenue, guaranteed revenue, and
indemnity in whole farm insurance were estimated using the following equation:
(14) CFWFI Re v = ∑ Ai , f × Pi × Yi , f
i

where, CFWFI Re v is actual whole farm revenue,
Ai , f is planted acres of crop i,in the farm f,

Pi is output price of crop i,
Yi , f is the output of crop i in farm f.

The guaranteed revenue in whole farm insurance was estimated as
(15) CFWFI Guar = Ai. f × E ( Pi ) × E (Yi , f ) × CL
where, CFWFI Guar is guaranteed revenue in whole farm insurance,
E ( Pi ) is the expected output price of crop i,
E (Yi , f ) is the expected farm yield for crop i in the farm f,

CL is the insurance coverage level.
The indemnity pay out in the whole farm insurance was estimated using the
equation
(16) CFWFI INDEM = Max{CFWFI Guar − CFWFI Re v ),0}
Where, CFWFI INDEM is the indemnity payout in the whole farm insurance.
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The indemnity is paid only when the actual farm revenue falls below the
guaranteed farm revenue, otherwise indemnity would be zero.

Certainty Equivalent Calculations

For purposes of comparison, similar calculations are performed for a hypothetical
CAWFI model under restricted and optimal level and whole farm insurance based on
farm-level yield (CFWFI). The estimated expected utility under different scenarios based
on net return on each scenario was converted into certainty equivalents of dollar value to
make comparison easier by using the following equations:
(17) CE j = e

E Uj

− Wo if r=1,

CE j = EU j (1 − r )

1
1− r

− Wo if r≠1.

where EUj is expected utility for scenario j,
Wo is initial wealth,
And CEj is certainty equivalent of scenario j.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA AND METHODS

Study Site

Four representative farms from four different states reflecting varied
crop/geographical regions were selected for this study. A representative Mississippi
soybean-corn farm, a representative Illinois soybean-corn farm, a representative Kansas
wheat-corn farm, and a representative North Dakota wheat-corn farm were selected.
Yazoo County from Mississippi, Mclean County from Illinois, Sheridan County from
Kansas, and Barnes County from North Dakota were considered for county-level yield
data.
The following crops were considered under this study in four diversified
geographical states:
a. Mississippi-Corn and soybean
b. Illinois-Corn and soybean
c. North-Dakota-Corn and wheat
d. Kansas-Corn and wheat
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Crop Mix/Farm types

In this study, single crop as well multi-crops farm were considered. The farm
types are discussed below.

Single Crop Farm
A farm where only one crop is grown is defined as a single crop farm. In this
study, the following single crop farms have been considered:
1. Corn Farm, Mississippi
2. Soybean Farm, Mississippi
3. Corn Farm Illinois
4. Soybean Farm, Illinois
5. Corn Farm, Kansas
6. Wheat farm, Kansas
7. Corn Farm, North Dakota
8. Wheat Farm, North Dakota

Multiple Crops Farm
In this study, farm types have been defined based on the acreage shares of crops
on the farm. The term crop mixes is also used synonymously with farm types in the case
of multiple crops grown on the farm. The following crop mix/farm types were considered
in this study in multi-crop farm scenario.
(a) Equal Acres Farm
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A multiple crop farm where all the crops are grown in the farm share on equal
(50:50) acres is called equal acres farm. For example, on 1000 acres of corn-soybean
farm, each crop is planted on 500 acres of land.
(b) Corn Major Farm
A multiple cropping farm where corn occupies 70% of acres and the other crop
only 30% of acres is called a corn major farm. The representative corn-soybean farm in
Mississippi where corn occupies 70% of the farm acreage is an example of a corn major
farm.
(c) Wheat Major Farm
A multiple cropping farm where wheat is grown on 70% of the total farm acres
and any other crop on 30% of the land is referred to as a “wheat major” farm. For
example, in Kansas where wheat is grown in 70% of the farm acres and corn on 30%, it is
called a wheat major farm.
(d) Soybean Major Farm
A multiple cropping farm where soybean is grown on 70% of the farm acres is a
soybean major farm. For example, an Illinois farm where soybean is grown on 70% of
total farm acres and corn on 30% is called a soybean major farm.
Based on the above criteria, this study would have the following 12 multiple crop
farm types or crop mixes:
1. Equal Acres Farm, Mississippi
2. Corn Major Farm, Mississippi
3. Soybean Major Farm, Mississippi
4. Equal Acres Farm, Illinois
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5. Corn major Farm, Illinois
6. Soybean Major Farm, Illinois
7. Equal Acres Farm, Kansas
8. Corn Major Farm, Kansas
9. Wheat Major Farm, Kansas
10. Equal Acres Farm, North Dakota
11. Corn Major Farm, North Dakota
12. Wheat Major Farm, North Dakota

Yield Data

The county yield data from the selected county of four states were obtained from
the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the United States Department of
Agriculture (NASS/USDA, 2010). Corn, soybean and wheat yield data were used for this
study. The yield data for Illinois, Mississippi, Kansas, and North Dakota are from 1975 to
2009.

Detrending County Yield
Technology changes overtime tend to affect crop yield (Anderson and Hazel,
1987). As such, in order to make the yield data comparable across years, the trend of the
yields were taken out and adjusted to the current year 2010 yield. A linear trend
specification of yields is used for each county and crop (Hafner 2003, Tweeten 1998,
Hazell 1984). These were estimated separately using the 35 years of data from 1975 to
2009. The regression model is:
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(18) Yit = α 0i + α1i t + ε it
where, Yit is yield for crop i=1, 2 in year t=1 for 1975, 2 for 1976,….35 for 2009.

α 0i is intercept,
α1i is the trend coefficient for the trend component,
ε it is the error term for crop i in year t.
Adding this trend coefficient times the difference between 2010 and observed
year, the detrended yield for each year from 1975 to 2009 on each geographical region
were obtained and adjusted by the current year, 2010 using the following equation,
(19) Yit det = αˆ 0 i + (36 − t )αˆ1i + εˆ1t
Where, the αˆ 0 i , αˆ1i , and εˆit are estimated from the equation (18) above,
Yit det is detrended yield for crop i in year t,

the trend component t=36 for the current year 2010.

Simulation of Farm Yield
The farm-level yields were simulated from the detrended county-level yields
according to Miranda’s formulations as described in Coble and Dismukes (2008).
Miranda’s specification is given as:
(20) Y f ,t = µ f + β f ( y c ,t − µ c ) + ε f ,t
Where, Y f ,t and yc ,t are random farm yield and county yield respectively at period t,

µ f and µc are the expected farm and county yields,
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β f is the responsiveness of a farm yield to county yield deviations from the
expected county yield

ε f ,t is the idiosyncratic risk. The idiosyncratic risk here is the variance in yield
resulting from randomness observed uniquely in each farm.
Coble and Dismukes (2008) describe that, the beta coefficient from the equation
(20) is the response of county yield deviation from its mean on farm yield. The
idiosyncratic risk shown by Miranda is indicated by the error term. In this process, the
error term is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2, i.e.

εf

N (0, σ 2 ) where standard deviation of idiosyncratic farm risk is denoted by σ.

Assuming that county yields are true aggregations of all farms in the county, then for a
representative farm, the beta coefficient would be equal to 1, which is the average of all
beta’s in the county weighted by acreage.
By comparing the ratio of indemnity payoffs conditioned on the guaranteed price,
PGuar and coverage level CL, the expected loss cost was derived. Locking down the
coverage level at 65%, a grid searched was performed from 0.1σ to 10σ by intervals of
0.01σ, where σ is the standard deviation of a county-level yield for a given crop and
location. The standard deviation of idiosyncratic farm yield was thus obtained.
A grid search was performed to estimate the idiosyncratic risk of each crop in
each farm by inserting equation (20) into the following equation to simulate RMA crop
insurance premium rates.

(21) Min PR65 − ELCσ , where ELCσ = E[
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Where, PR65 is premium rate for crop yield insurance in each county at 65%
coverage level which comes from the RMA premium rate, and ELCσ is expected loss
cost under a given standard deviation of σ.
The only unknown parameter in the right hand side of equation (20) is the
standard deviation of idiosyncratic yield risk (σ) of ε ft . The investigation of σ value is the
major interest here to obtain farm-level yield. The expected farm yield ( µ f ) is assumed
to be equal to expected county yield ( µc ), where yield µc is obtained from the countylevel yield, which have mentioned in table 3. The yct is observed county-level yield for
year t. In equation (21), PGuar cancel out each other, and CL is chosen as 65%, µ f = µc ,
and y ft is obtained for different values of σ. The stepwise procedure to obtain farm-level
yield from county-level yield is summarized into following three steps.
Step I:
Assuming a value for σ equal to some constant c1, 1,000 values of ε ft were
generated. Plugging those ε ft values into equation (20), 1,000 random Y ft were obtained.
These Y ft values with σ=c1 were inserted into second part of equation (21) and the average
across observations for each σ i.e., expected loss cost ( ELCσ for σ =c1) is estimated and
used in first part of equation (21) to obtain an absolute difference of the objective
function. Obtained absolute difference of objective function for the given σ value is
recorded. This process is replicated assuming different values of σ, like σ =c2, c3…cn.
Step II:
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The absolute difference across different values of σ noted in step I from the first
part of equation (18) were compared and the minimum absolute difference was selected.
The value of σ at the minimum absolute difference would be the optimized standard
deviation (σ) value for the idiosyncratic yield risk.
Step III:
Once standard deviation for error term σ is obtained, then it is plugged into the
equation (20) to obtain the farm yield for 35 consecutive years using observed countylevel yield for respective years from 1975 to 2009.

Price Data

For this study, price data of the 1975 to 2009 were obtained from the Economic
Research Services of United States Department of Agriculture (ERS/USDA, 2010). The
price at planting and harvesting futures prices at planting time of corn, soybean, and
wheat were used. The change in price from planting to harvesting time for each crop was
obtained for each year. These price changes were used in the study.

Developing a Simulation Model

A simulation model was developed to simulate correlated random prices and
yields using multivariate simulation technique.

Monte Carlo Simulation
In stochastic simulation, by identifying the probability distribution of the known
stochastic variables, the prediction to the actual scenario would be made. Monte Carlo
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simulation is one of the most popular sampling methods that can generate thousands of
observations having the same properties as the original set of data. Monte Carlo sampling
uses Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) where distribution would range 0-1
(Hardakar et al., 2004: 157-166). A value from the Y-axis is taken randomly, and CDF is
computed. By inverting the CDF function, the value on the X-axis is obtained. This is
shown in Figure 4.

CDF-1

Y
1

X

0

Figure 4
Inverse Function of Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)

Multivariate Simulation
A multivariate stochastic simulation technique has been developed to generate
analogous samples and used to evaluate alternative insurance products (Anderson,
Barnett, and Coble, 2009).
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Parametric distribution fitting imposes a family of probability density to a data
series while non-parametric does not impose a specific density structure and allows the
empirical data to drive probability. The parametric distribution smoothes the data and a
distribution will generate observations outside the range of empirical data. Parametric
distribution procedures add information to the estimation and make the estimation more
efficient if the data is drawn from the distribution imposed. However, imposing the
wrong distribution introduces error. Estimating CDFs precisely, reliable simulation
techniques are important for conducting a rigorous agricultural risk analysis. To use the
PQH simulation technique, the yield trend will be estimated and removed from the data
before fitting parametric distributions.
Several studies in agricultural economics support the use of beta distribution for
yield data and log normal distribution for price data (Roberts, Goodwin and Coble, 1998).
Crop yields are non-negative, and the beta distribution ranges from 0 to 1, but can be
scaled to any interval. However, one must impose or estimate the upper and lower bound
to assume for scaling. Price is non-negative having lower bound value zero to upper
bound positive infinitive. These parametric assumptions were tested for historical data.
The marginal probability distribution and correlation matrix for the original data set were
obtained. Using Eigen values and decomposition of correlation matrix, 100,000 sample
data for price and yield were generated through PQH simulation technique.
Price and yield are random variables but may not be independent. The correlation
of price-price, yield-yield, and price-yield has been noticed. Crop yield has often been
found negatively correlated with price. The stochastic price, stochastic yield, and
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interaction of both price and yield were allowed in the simulation procedure (Hardakar et.
al., 2004:157-181).
While moving from farm-level data to county-level data, basis risk would occur
as those yields tend to be positively but not perfectly correlated with each other.
Therefore, the basis risk was analyzed for each available insurance model and was used
in indentifying the certainty equivalent of each model. Assuming the farmers are
moderately risk-averse and considering the risk-aversion coefficient of 2, returns from all
available insurance products were converted to utility values using the constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) function as mentioned above. Likewise, the certainty equivalent
for differing expected utility risk-aversion values was compared to measure the benefit of
CAWFI to producers of varying regions and crop mixes.

Construction of CAWFI Model

Customizable area whole farm insurance (CAWFI model was constructed
assigning appropriate weighting mechanism, searching for optimal scale, and
investigating optimal coverage level.

Assign of Appropriate Weight in CAWFI Model
Crop revenue weights were required to construct the CAWFI model. The
percentage of expected crops revenue in the multiple crop farming was chosen as an
appropriate weighting mechanism to customize county revenue to farm level. In the case
of a single crop farm, the weight is obviously one. The reason behind choosing revenue
share as an appropriate weight for CAWFI is that farmers would plan to grow crops
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based on the revenue percentage of the particular crop in the farm. For instance, there are
two crops corn and soybean in a farm where corn shares 75% of expected revenue and
soybean shares 25% of expected revenue. A crop that is generating a higher percentage of
expected revenue would be more likely to have higher weight and vice versa.

Optimal Scale and Optimal Coverage Level Assign on CAWFI Model
One of the fundamental issues addressed in this study was also to find an optimal
scale to the CAWFI model so that it could customize area yield into farm-level more
accurately. Based on crop mix, different optimal CAWFI scales were expected across the
farm types. The optimal weights obtained as a revenue share of crops in the farm were
fixed, and a search was conducted to find optimal scale for the CAWFI model.
In search for the optimal scale, initially it was allowed that both scale and
coverage levels vary simultaneously to arrive at an optimal point. Scale and coverage
level were unrestricted, and the optimal scale was obtained for different crop mixes in
Kansas and North Dakota. Using equation (13), beta coefficients were estimated for each
crop and crop mix independently. It was found that those beta coefficients were very
close to optimal scales obtained for Kansas and North Dakota. In the same way, beta
coefficients for all single crops as well as multiple crop revenue cases were obtained and
used as optimal scales, which later were used in estimating indemnity in the CAWFI
model. Based on these beta coefficients (optimal scale), a grid search was performed for
optimal coverage level for the model in the interval of 0.05 starting from 0.80 to 1.80.
This grid search was performed on each farm type across all regions. Thus, the CAWFI
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model with optimal scale and optimal coverage level was developed and will be called
‘optimal CAWFI’ hereafter.

Evaluation of Optimal CAWFI with Restricted CAWFI

Optimal CAWFI was evaluated for the single crop as well as multiple crop
revenue scenarios with its baseline in four geographical regions. The optimal scale and
coverage level were assigned to estimate optimal CAWFI-certainty equivalents revenue.
GRP uses a scale ranging from 0.90 to 1.50 and a maximum coverage level 0.90. For the
restricted CAWFI model, the maximum GRP coverage level of 0.90 was used. For the
optimal scale 1.50 or optimal CAWFI scale, whichever would be lower was used. The
baseline model is referred to as “restricted CAWFI model” as its coverage level and scale
are restricted per the GRP model. The certainty equivalents revenue were estimated, and
the relative difference in certainty equivalent revenue between optimal and restricted
CAWFI were estimated for each crop on the single crop farm and for each crop mix in
the multiple cropping farm.

Optimal CAWFI’s Performance over No-Insurance and CFWFI

The optimal CAWFI model was compared with the No-insurance program as well
with the CFWFI program. We followed basically two criteria to compare CAWFI’s with
CFWFI:
(i)

Certainty equivalents revenue

(ii)

Indemnity payoff
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The certainty equivalent criterion was used to observe which model would
generate higher certainty equivalents to insurers. Both the CAWFI and CFWFI were the
hypothetical insurance products, so the actuarially fair premium rate was used to compare
with. In actuarially fair premium rate, the indemnity generated is equaled to expected
indemnity. The indemnity pay out criteria was used to observe the magnitude of
payments for the farmer. The expected indemnity is the actuarially fair premium for the
insurance product that explains the risk reduction ability of the model. The market
premium rate includes transaction cost, government subsidy, and administrative cost,
from which risk reduction of the model cannot be accessed.
The logic behind the comparison of CAWFI against no-insurance program is that
risk-averse farmers will buy insurance when they can protect their revenue at least better
than no-insurance program. Because the program is actuarially fair, participation would
not change mean ending wealth, but an effective risk management tool will reduce risk,
which increases the certainty equivalent for a risk-averse farmer. The CFWFI was taken
as an instrument to compare with this as a whole farm insurance product based on farmlevel yield. The optimal CAWFI was evaluated across geographical regions for all farm
types in the multiple crop case and for all crops in the single crop case.
For the all types of evaluation in this study, initially, the net return under different
crop and crop mixes across all regions was estimated and converted into expected utility
assuming CRRA utility function of wealth for the moderately risk-averse farmers,
assuming the risk aversion coefficient 2. Finally, those expected utility values were
converted into the certainty equivalents revenue, and comparisons were made based on
these certainty equivalents revenues.
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Sensitivity Test on the Optimal CAWFI Model

In this study, mainly two assumptions have been made. The revenue share of crop
in the farm was considered as an appropriate weight in the optimal CAWFI, and all
calculations were made assuming the moderately risk-averse behavior of farmers.
Sensitivity tests for these two assumptions were made to confirm what else would result
if the assumptions were not held.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Data Description

The county-level yields and planting and harvesting prices at planting for corn,
soybean, and wheat were used in this study. The brief description of the data is discussed
below.

County-Level Yield
The descriptive statistics of raw data (before detrending yield) is presented in
table 1. It describes mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values of data set
across crops for all locations.
Among the three crops (corn, soybean, and wheat), Illinois corn has a higher
mean value with respect to the other locations. Both the mean and standard deviation for
wheat are similar in Kansas and North Dakota. Mean soybean yields are higher in Illinois
as compared to Mississippi, but the two locations have similar standard deviations.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of County-Level Yield Prior to Detrending

Location

Crop

Mean

Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum

Mclean County, Illinois

Corn

143.28

31.36

62.00

196.00

Soybean 45.40

6.64

25.50

54.00

Corn

31.61

29.50

150.80

Soybean 26.45

7.60

16.00

40.00

Corn

137.75

18.80

97.00

177.00

Wheat

37.65

9.66

17.00

58.00

Corn

78.79

32.31

20.90

146.00

Wheat

35.41

10.24

15.40

59.00

Yazoo County, Mississippi

Sheridan County, Kansas
Barnes County, North
Dakota

95.10

Yield Detrending and Current Adjustment
The county-level yields from 1975 to 2009 were detrended. The estimation of
trend coefficient using equation (18) along with the standard errors and p values is
presented in table 2.
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Table 2
Estimation of Trend Coefficient for County Yield
Location

Crop

Mclean County, Illinois

Corn

2.15 ***

0.378

<.0001

Soybean

0.40***

0.087

<.0001

Yazoo County, Mississippi

Corn
Soybean

2.81***
0.42***

0.22
0.106

<.0001
0.0003

Sheridan County, Kansas

Corn
Wheat
Corn

0.36
0.41
2.49***

0.313
0.163
0.335

0.2557
0.682
<.0001

Wheat
*** indicates significance at 1% level.

0.61***

0.136

<.0001

Barnes County, North Dakota

Coefficient Std. Error

p value

The trend coefficients are significant in all crops across states except in Kansas.
The trend coefficient for corn in Kansas is very low as compared with the trend
coefficient of corn in other locations. The Kansas corn yield seems increasing in
decreasing order until 2000, but after 2000, it has dropped down continuously, which
might be the possible reason the trend coefficient was low. Based on these trend
coefficients, detrended county yield were obtained in the counties for all crops across
states using equation (19). The detrended county yield data were subsequently used to
simulate farm level yield.
The descriptive statistics of county yield after detrending and adjusting to current
year 2010 yield have been presented in table 3 which describe mean and standard
deviation.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Detrended Yield after Current Adjustment

Location

Crop

Mclean County, Illinois

Corn

180.33

22.25

Soybean

52.56

5.11

Corn

148.69

12.6

Soybean

32.77

6.36

Corn

137.97

19.35

Wheat

35.67

11.05

Corn

119.71

21.9

Wheat

45.28

8.14

Yazoo County, Mississippi

Sheridan County, Kansas

Barnes County, North Dakota

Mean

Std. Deviation

From table 3, Illinois corn yield is shown to have a higher mean as compared with
corn yields in other locations. The mean soybean yield is higher in Illinois as compared to
Mississippi. The mean wheat yield of North Dakota is higher than Kansas while the
standard deviation in North Dakota is lower Kansas.

Farm-Level Yield Simulation from County-Level Yield
To simulate farm yield from county level yield, the standard deviation of
idiosyncratic farm yield was obtained through a grid search. The results of grid search
conducted to obtain the standard deviation value for all crops across all locations has
presented in figure 5
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Figure 5
The Grid Search Results to Obtain Standard Deviation of Idiosyncratic Yield
Risk in All Locations across Crops
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The graphical result in figure 5 suggests that in the representative corn farm in
Kansas, the optimization solution is at the end of the range. In the representative soybean
farm in Illinois, the optimal solution is relatively flat. For the rest of the representative
farms, the optimal solution can clearly be observed at the bottom of U-shaped curve.
The estimated standard deviations of the idiosyncratic yield risk, based on grid
search results presented in figure 5 using the equations (20) and (21) are presented in
table 4.

Table 4
Standard Deviation of Idiosyncratic Yield Risk across Crops and States

Location

Crop

Standard Deviation of the
Idiosyncratic Yield risk

Mclean County, Illinois

Corn

37

Soybean

11

Corn

48

Soybean

23

Corn

96

Wheat

27

Corn

79

Wheat

18

Yazoo County, Mississippi

Sheridan County, Kansas

Barnes County, North Dakota

Comparing across the crops and the states, the idiosyncratic yield risk was the
highest in Kansas corn (σ = 94), and the lowest in Illinois soybean (σ = 11). Farm yields
were simulated for each crop in each state by incorporating the estimated idiosyncratic
yield risk values in the equation (20) into equation (21).
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The standard deviation of county yield was compared with the standard deviation
of representative farm-level yield for all crops across states using table 3 and table 4. The
standard deviation of county level yield is relatively lower as compared to the standard
deviation of representative farm yield for all crops across states. The representative farm
yield has a standard deviation almost double that of the standard deviation of countylevel yield in soybean farm in Illinois. In the same way, the standard deviation of
representative farm yield of corn in Mississippi is almost four folds as compared to
standard deviation of county yield of corn in Mississippi.

Descriptive Statistics of Simulated Observations (N=100,000)
The farm-level yields, county-level yields, and prices were simulated to generate
100,000 observations. The descriptive statistics of 100,000 simulated observations used
during this study are presented in Table 5. This table shows the mean and standard
deviation of the study data. The ending futures price of soybean has the highest standard
deviation from its mean as compared to other crops, 1.53 and 1.28, respectively. The
ending futures price deviation for wheat, corn, and cotton are less than one. The corn
farm yield is less variable in Mississippi and Illinois and more variable in Kansas and
North Dakota. The Illinois corn yield has a higher mean and lower variance as compared
to Mississippi corn. Mississippi and Kansas corn has similar mean yields but standard
deviation is very high in Kansas corn as compared to Mississippi corn. For corn county
yield, variation is lowest in Mississippi and seems very close in the other three States.
The Mississippi soybean farm yield is more variable than Illinois (i.e., the standard
deviation of soybean farm yield is double in Mississippi as compared to Illinois). Illinois
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soybean has higher mean and lower variance as compared to Mississippi soybean. The
county-level soybean yield variation is similar in Illinois and Mississippi. In the case of
wheat, the farm- as well as county-level yield in North Dakota has higher mean with
lower variance as compared to Kansas.

Table 5
Descriptive Statistics of Simulated Data (N=100000)
Variable

Mean

Std Dev.

Ending Futures Price of Corn

6.19

0.53

Ending Futures Price of Soybean

13.11

1.54

Ending Futures Price of Wheat

9.08

0.94

Mean

Std Dev.

Illinois

Mississippi

Corn Farm Yield

145.45

49.53

182.72

43.20

Corn County Yield

148.70

12.62

180.48

22.24

Soybean Farm Yield

37.53

22.69

53.29

11.19

Soybean County Yield

32.76
6.38
North Dakota

52.56
5.12
Kansas

Corn Farm Yield

129.98

76.27

143.58

77.76

Corn County Yield

119.75

21.93

137.95

19.27

Wheat Farm Yield

46.76

18.25

32.74

21.60

Wheat County Yield

45.29

8.14

35.67

11.09

Revenue Share of Crop as an Appropriate Weight

The revenue percentage of individual crops in the multi-crop farm is presented in
Table 6 for the multiple crop case on Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Illinois
farms.
53

Template Created By: Damen Peterson 2009
Table 6
Revenue Share of Crops in Different Crop Mixes across States

State

Crop Mix

Revenue Share of Crops
Corn
Soybean
Wheat

Mississippi

Equal Acres

0.647

0.353

(2 Crops)

Corn Major

0.810

0.190

Soybean Major

0.440

0.560

Illinois

Equal Acres

0.618

0.382

(2 crops)

Corn Major

0.791

0.209

Soybean Major

0.410

0.590

Kansas

Equal Acres

0.750

0.250

(2 crops)

Corn Major

0.875

0.125

Wheat Major

0.562

0.438

North Dakota

Equal Acres

0.655

0.345

(2 Crops)

Corn Major

0.816

0.184

Wheat Major
0.448
Note: All crop mixes are as defined in method section

0.552

The ending futures prices for corn, soybean, and wheat were used to estimate
revenue share of crops in the farm under different crop mixes. To estimate revenue share
of crops, mean farm yield of each crop was multiplied by the respective ending futures
prices. Then, those percentages were converted according to the crop mix. For example,
in the Mississippi corn-soybean farm, revenue share of crops in equally distributed acres
of crops in the farm is given as:
Corn farm yield * ending futures prices of corn* 0.50.
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As mentioned in Table 6, the revenue share of crops is quite different across farm
types in the same state. In Mississippi, Illinois, and North Dakota, when corn is not the
major crop, its revenue share is below 50%. Either it is in equally distributed acres or on
a corn major farm; corn revenue share is fairly greater than other crops. In Kansas, corn is
sharing more than half the farm’s revenue even in soybean major farms. Corn’s
dominance over soybean or wheat can be observed in contributing revenue in the farm.
These results suggest that revenue percentage of crops in the multi-crop farm vary
according to states and farm types. This is the reason why different weights were
assigned to crops according to crop mix across states.

Optimal CAWFI Estimation

In the four different geographical locations, the optimal scale and coverage level
were identified for single crop farms as well as for multi-crop farms. The CAWFI model
with these optimal scale and coverage level is known as optimal CAWFI.

Single-Crop Farm
For the single crop in four states, the optimal scales (beta coefficient), optimal
coverage levels were estimated for all crops in all locations.

Optimal Scale
The response of deviation of county revenue from its mean on farm revenue for
single crop scenarios in Kansas, North Dakota, Illinois, and Mississippi were estimated
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using OLS from the 100,000 samples. The coefficient estimation using equation (13) in
single crop context is presented in table 7.

Table 7
Single-Crop: Estimation of Optimal Scale

State

Crop/Crop Mix Coefficient Standard Error

Kansas

Corn

2.74***

0.005

<0.0001

Wheat

1.63***

0.002

<0.0001

Corn

2.59***

0.005

<0.0001

Wheat

1.79***

0.003

<0.0001

Corn

2.01***

0.005

<0.0001

Soybean

2.32***

0.007

<0.0001

Corn

1.45***

0.002

<0.0001

1.46***

0.003

<0.0001

North Dakota

Mississippi

Illinois

Soybean
*** Significant at 1% level.

P Value

These beta coefficients are used as the optimal scale in the CAWFI model. The
beta coefficients are significant in all crops for all locations. This beta coefficient is the
measure of linear response of county revenue deviation to farm revenue deviation from
mean. These optimal scale values vary across crops as well as regions. In Kansas, corn
shows higher optimal scale than wheat -- 2.74 versus 1.63. A similar result is found in the
North Dakota corn and wheat, which are 2.59 and 1.79, respectively. Both states are
assumed to grow the same crops -- corn and wheat. The case of Illinois is different than
previous states where optimal scale for corn and soybean are almost equal, i.e., 1.45 and
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1.46, respectively In Mississippi; optimal scale for soybean is higher than corn, which is
also seen in Illinois. Mississippi and Illinois are growing the same crops, corn and
soybean.
Optimal scale also varies for the same crops across states. Corn is the only crop in
this study assumed to grow in all four states. While comparing the scale for corn across
states, Kansas has the highest value, and then North Dakota, Mississippi, and Illinois in
descending order ranging from 2.74 to 1.45. Optimal scale for soybean in Mississippi is
2.32, which is higher than the optimal scale in Illinois, 1.46. In the same way, North
Dakota wheat and Kansas wheat have different optimal scales, respectively 1.79 and
1.63.
The optimal scales for all crops across states are above 1.00. These results are
consistent with Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov (2007) and Miranda (1991), but note that
their works were on single crop area yield not in the area revenue.

Optimal Coverage Level
Optimal coverage levels are investigated based on the optimal scale, and are
presented in Table 8 for single crop farms in four states.
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Table 8
Single-Crop: Optimal Coverage Level for Optimal Scale
State
Kansas

North Dakota

Illinois

Mississippi

Crop

Optimal Scale

Optimal Coverage Level

corn

2.74

1.35

Wheat

1.63

1.40

Corn

2.59

1.30

Wheat

1.79

1.35

Corn

1.45

1.30

Soybean

1.46

1.40

Corn

2.01

1.25

Soybean

2.32

1.50

The optimal coverage level also varies across crops as well as regions. Mississippi
soybean has the highest optimal coverage level, 1.50, while Mississippi corn has the
lowest optimal coverage level (1.25) among all the crops. Illinois corn and soybean have
different optimal coverage levels, 1.30 and 1.40, respectively. Corn has different optimal
coverage levels across states: it is highest in Kansas, 1.40, and lowest in Mississippi,
1.25. Wheat in Kansas and North Dakota has 1.40 and 1.35 optimal coverage levels,
respectively. Soybean optimal coverage levels range among the two states more than
wheat (1.50 in Mississippi and 1.40 in Illinois). The optimal coverage levels for soybean
are also higher than other crops, which reflect that farmers would have to go for higher
coverage levels in soybean to fully protecting their farm revenue. Illinois corn and
soybean have the lowest optimal scale, but their optimal coverage levels are not the
highest among all.
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For all crops across states, optimal coverage levels for optimal scales are greater
than 1.00. In area product, GRP, Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov (2007) have found the
similar result -- when the restriction is relaxed, optimal coverage level moves above 1.00.
Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov’s study proved this in the case of area yield insurance,
which, based on this analysis, applies to CAWFI as well. Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov
assert that optimal scale partially compensates for optimal coverage level when one of
those is restricted. In this analysis, the scale and coverage levels were relaxed, so, that
relationship could not be observed here.

Multiple Crops Farm
In the two crops revenue case, the beta coefficient (optimal scale) for each crop
mix across all four states was also estimated. Based on those optimal scales, optimal
coverage level was investigated using a grid search for all crop mixes in all locations.

Optimal Scale
The response of deviation of county revenue from its mean to farm revenue
deviation from its mean in multiple crop case in Kansas, North Dakota, Illinois, and
Mississippi for all crop mixes was estimated using equation (13) in multi-crop revenue is
presented in table 9.
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Table 9
Multiple Crops: Estimation of Optimal Scale

State

Crop/Crop Mix

Kansas

Equal Acres

2.02***

0.003

<0.0001

Corn Major

2.28***

0.004

<0.0001

Wheat major

1.87***

0.003

<0.0001

Equal Acres

1.98***

0.003

<0.0001

Corn Major

2.21***

0.004

<0.0001

Wheat major

1.81***

0.003

<0.0001

Equal Acres

2.4***

0.005

<0.0001

Corn Major

2.12***

0.005

<0.0001

Soybean Major

2.85***

0.005

<0.0001

Equal Acres

1.29***

0.002

<0.0001

Corn Major

1.32***

0.002

<0.0001

1.41***

0.002

<0.0001

North
Dakota

Mississippi

Illinois

Soybean Major
*** Significant at 1% level.

Coefficient

Standard Error

P Value

These beta coefficients are the optimal scales that are used in optimal the CAWFI
model for multiple crop revenues. As in single crop cases, these beta coefficients in
multiple crop revenue cases are the linear response of farm revenue deviation from its
mean on county revenue deviation from its mean. All the coefficients are significant.
In the multiple crop revenue cases, beta coefficients are varied across crop mixes
and also across states in the same crop mix. The soybean major farm in Mississippi has
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the highest beta coefficient, and the equal acres farm in Illinois has the lowest beta
coefficient among all.
The optimal scales found are the beta coefficient, varies for the same crop mix
across states. The coefficients for all crop mixes are very low in Illinois as compared to
others. Likewise, in single crop, and in this multiple crop revenue case, optimal scales are
greater than 1.0 for all crop mixes across all geographical regions. This finding is similar
with Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov (2007), Miranda (1991) asserts that in single-crop area
yield context when the farmers are freed to choose scale, they would go beyond 1.00. The
scales differ across states, even in the same crop mix.

Optimal Coverage Level
The optimal coverage levels for optimal scale in each crop mix across states in
multiple crops are in the Table 10.
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Table 10
Multiple Crops: Optimal Coverage Level for Optimal Scale

Optimal Scale

Optimal Coverage
Level

Equal Acres

2.02

1.25

Corn Major

2.28

1.35

Wheat Major

1.87

1.35

Equal Acres

1.98

1.35

Corn Major

2.21

1.45

Wheat Major

1.81

1.30

Equal Acres

1.29

1.20

Corn Major

1.32

1.30

Soybean major

1.41

1.20

Equal Acres

2.40

1.20

Corn Major

2.12

1.25

Soybean major

2.85

1.20

Region

Crop Mix

Kansas

North Dakota

Illinois

Mississippi

These optimal coverage levels are varied across crop mixes. For example, in
Kansas, optimal coverage levels are lower, 1.25 on equal acres farms, whereas corn
major and soybean major farms have higher than optimal coverage levels as compared to
equal acres farms, 1.35. In both Illinois and Mississippi, optimal coverage levels are
lower than other states. In Mississippi, the range is 1.20 – 1.25 whereas in Kansas the
range is 1.20-1.30.
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The optimal coverage levels in CAWFI are varied across states for the same crop
mix. For the equal acres farm, North Dakota has the highest optimal coverage level,
followed by Kansas, and Mississippi and Illinois being the lowest. For the corn major
farm, North Dakota has the highest optimal coverage level followed by Kansas, Illinois,
and Mississippi. The wheat major Kansas farm has a higher optimal coverage level than
the North Dakota wheat major farm. Only for the soybean major farm, both Illinois and
Mississippi have an equal optimal coverage level, 1.20.
As in the single crop, in this multiple crop revenue case, optimal coverage levels
are greater than 1.00 for all crop mixes across all geographical regions. This finding is
similar with Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov (2007) for the single crop area yield product,
GRP context.

Effects of Imposing Restriction on CAWFI Model

The optimal CAWFI is compared with the restricted CAWFI model where
maximum scale and coverage level allowed in GRP are used to estimate restricted
CAWFI certainty equivalent revenue. In this study, the optimal CAWFI was compared in
single crop as well as multiple crop revenue contexts for all crops and crop mixes across
states.

Single Crop Farm: Optimal CAWFI vs. Restricted CAWFI
In Kansas, North Dakota, Illinois, and Mississippi, certainty equivalent revenue
for all crops in the farm were estimated. The certainty equivalent revenue for both
optimal as well as restricted models was obtained. The focus here is to observe how
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restriction on scale and coverage level reduces the certainty equivalent revenue for the
insured. The general expectation here was that putting a restriction on scale and coverage
level would lower an insured’s welfare and that relaxing a restriction may increase a
farmer’s welfare. These results have been presented in Table 11 below

Table 11
Single Crop: Optimal CAWFI vs. Restricted CAWFI
Optimal Max.
Max. GRP Lower CER in
Optimal
Coverage. GRP
Coverage Restricted
Scale for
Level for Scale for Level for CAWFI than
Optimal
Optimal Restricted Restricted Optimal CAWFI
CAWFI
CAWFI CAWFI CAWFI by (%)

State

Crop

Kansas

corn

2.74

1.35

1.5

0.9

-12.98

Wheat

1.63

1.4

1.5

0.9

-10.77

2.59

1.3

1.5

0.9

-13.57

Wheat

1.79

1.35

1.5

0.9

-5.44

Corn

1.45

1.3

1.45

0.9

-4.78

Soybean

1.46

1.4

1.46

0.9

-3.12

Corn

2.01

1.25

1.5

0.9

-9.61

Soybean

2.32

1.5

1.5

0.9

-11.94

North Dakota Corn

Illinois

Mississippi

Note: CER stands for Certainty Equivalent revenue

Imposing constraint in choosing scale and coverage level in single crop county
revenue has reduced farmers’ certainty revenues ranging from 3.12% in Illinois soybean
to 13.57% in North Dakota corn.
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Evaluating crops across states, Mississippi corn has almost equal percentage of
certainty equivalent revenue loss to Kansas wheat. Mississippi soybean is facing almost
equal percentage of certainty equivalent loss to Kansas corn. In both states for both crops,
loss percentages are very high. North Dakota wheat has a similar percentage of loss of
certainty equivalent revenue as in Illinois corn while the percentage certainty revenue
loss in North Dakota corn is very close to Kansas corn. As in area yield products, the
imposition of restriction on scale and coverage level has reduced the farmer’s expected
utility in this single crop optimal CAWFI.

Multiple Crops Farm: Optimal CAWFI vs. Restricted CAWFI
Similar to single crop, this study estimated the certainty equivalent revenue for
the optimal CAWFI as well as restricted CAWFI model in multiple crops. The certainty
equivalent revenues were estimated for Kansas, North Dakota, Illinois, and Mississippi in
all crop mixes. Prior expectation here was also the same as in the single crop revenue
case that is relaxing restriction on CAWFI can increase farmer’s expected utility. Based
on certainty equivalent revenue, the percentage loss in restricted CAWFI models is
presented in Table 12.
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Table 12
Multiple Crops: Optimal CAWFI vs. Restricted CAWFI
Optimal
Optimal
Max. GRP
Coverage
Scale for
Scale for
Level for
Optimal
Restricted
Optimal
CAWFI
CAWFI
CAWFI

Max. GRP
Coverage
Level for
Restricted
CAWFI

Lower CER in
Restricted
CAWFI than
Optimal
CAWFI by
(%)

State

Crop Mix

Kansas

Equal Acres

2.02

1.25

1.5

0.9

-9.15

Corn Major

2.28

1.35

1.5

0.9

-10.36

Wheat Major

1.87

1.35

1.5

0.9

-8.49

Equal Acres

1.98

1.35

1.5

0.9

-6.28

Corn Major

2.21

1.45

1.5

0.9

-8.38

Wheat Major

1.81

1.3

1.5

0.9

-4.48

Equal Acres

1.29

1.2

1.29

0.9

-3.64

Corn Major

1.32

1.3

1.32

0.9

-3.92

Soybean Major

1.41

1.2

1.41

0.9

-3.56

Equal Acres

2.4

1.2

1.5

0.9

-11.27

Corn Major

2.12

1.25

1.5

0.9

-9.95

Soybean Major

2.85

1.2

1.5

0.9

-13.85

North Dakota

Illinois

Mississippi

Note: CER stands for Certainty Equivalent revenue

The restriction imposed on farmers in selecting scale and coverage level in
multiple crops optimal CAWFI has reduced certainty equivalent revenue by 3.56% in the
soybean major farm in Illinois and by 13.85% in the soybean major farm in Mississippi.
In Kansas, the corn major farm has the highest certainty equivalent revenue loss
percentage, followed by the equal acres farm and wheat major farm in Kansas. In North
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Dakota, restricting scale and coverage level would decrease certainty equivalent revenue
by 8.38% in the corn major farm, followed by the equal acres farm and wheat major
farm. The results in Kansas and North Dakota have shown a similar pattern; however, the
percentage loss in North Dakota is lower than in Kansas. Illinois farms have the lowest
percentage loss for all crop mixes among all states. In Mississippi, the soybean major
farm has the highest percentage of expected utility loss followed by the equal acres farm
and corn major farm. Mississippi farms have a higher percentage loss as compared to
Illinois for all crop mixes though both states have grown the same crops.
Restriction on scale and coverage level has yielded different percentages of loss in
the same crop mixes across states. As in the single crop CAWFI, multiple crops CAWFI
produces the similar results that imposing a restriction to the CAWFI model would
reduce farmers’ welfare. This result is consistent with the area yield product, GRP, where
restriction on scale and coverage reduces farmers’ expected utility.

Evaluation of Optimal CAWFI with No-Insurance and Whole Farm Insurance
(CFWFI)

The optimal CAWFI’s performance was evaluated against no-insurance program,
restricted CAWFI program, or whole farm insurance based on farm-level yield (CFWFI).
This study compares certainty equivalent revenue generated by each model and also
compares expected indemnity payouts. The comparisons were made for single crop
CAWFI as well as multiple crops CAWFI.
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Evaluation in Single Crop Farm
The certainty equivalent revenue for Kansas, North Dakota, Illinois, and
Mississippi for all crops was estimated with no program, optimal CAWFI, restricted
CAWFI, or CFWFI, which have been presented in relative percentage in Table 13. In
addition, to evaluate among these three models, expected indemnity for each models have
also been estimated and presented in the same table.

Table 13
Single Crop: Optimal CAWFI vs. No-Insurance and 90% CFWFI
Ratio of
Ratio of
CER in
CER in 90%
Optimal
CFWFI to
CAWFI to
No Program
No program

Ratio of
CER in
Restricted
CAWFI to
No Program

Ratio of
Expected
Indemnity in
Optimal
CAWFI to
90% CFWFI

Ratio of
Expected
Indemnity in
Restricted
CAWFI to
90% CFWFI

State

Crop

Kansas

Corn

1.23

1.23

1.08

3.84

0.28

Wheat

1.31

1.32

1.18

2.36

0.75

1.28

1.27

1.12

2.86

0.35

Wheat

1.11

1.12

1.06

3.76

0.57

Corn

1.10

1.10

1.04

4.94

0.63

Soybean

1.03

1.05

1.02

7.49

0.56

Corn

1.10

1.13

1.03

4.14

0.16

North Dakota Corn

Illinois

Mississippi

1.81
1.70
1.55
3.36
0.32
Soybean
Note: Scale and Coverage Level for Optimal and Restricted CAWFI are in table 5
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The optimal CAWFI increases certainty equivalents relative to no-insurance
program in all crops for the single crop revenue scenario. In the previous section, it was
shown that optimal CAWFI outperforms restricted CAWFI. The restricted CAWFI’s
certainty equivalent revenue was also compared against no-insurance program. Results
show that, in each crop in all four states, even restricted CAWFI’s certainty equivalent
revenues are greater than no-insurance program. The restricted CAWFI outperforms over
no-insurance program by 2% in Illinois soybean farm and by 55% in the Mississippi
soybean farm. That the restricted and optimal CAWFI are able to produce more certainty
equivalent revenue compared with no-insurance program illustrates that CAWFI is a
workable insurance product that can protect farmers from loss.
The certainty equivalent revenue in whole farm insurance based on farm-level
yield (CFWFI) and optimal CAWFI were compared with no-insurance program for
baseline. As CFWFI and optimal CAWFI were compared for some crops in some states,
CAWFI performs better and for some other crops CFWFI performs better. For instance,
optimal CAWFI in Kansas wheat outperforms by 1% more over no-insurance program
than CFWFI, optimal CAWFI in North Dakota wheat also outperforms by 1% more than
CFWFI over no-insurance program. That the optimal CAWFI produces higher certainty
equivalents as compared with 90% CFWFI in most of the crops illustrates that optimal
CAWFI can minimize the whole farm risk as equally as CFWFI.
Based on the actuarially fair rate of insurance premium, an evaluation was made
across three models -- optimal CAWFI, restricted CAWFI, and 90% CFWFI. The
expected indemnity for each model was compared for all crops in all states, considering
90% CFWFI as a baseline. The expected indemnities for optimal CAWFI are highest
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among these three models in each state for all crops, followed by 90% CFWFI, and
restricted CAWFI having the lowest indemnity payouts.
In the single crop context, the expected indemnity in optimal CAWFI is 236%
higher in Kansas wheat to 749% in Illinois soybean as compared with 90% CFWFI.
Farmers would have to pay from more than two folds to more than seven folds for
optimal CAWFI as compared with 90% CFWFI depending upon crop mix and state.
However, the restricted CAWFI produces lower certainty equivalent revenue, but it can
provide protection to farmers with fairly lower premiums as compared to 90% CFWFI.

Evaluation in Multiple Crops Farm
Optimal CAWFI, restricted CAWFI, and CFWFI under multiple crop scenarios
were compared using the certainty equivalents and expected indemnity payouts for those
models. Results are in Table 14.
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Table 14
Multiple Crops: Optimal CAWFI vs. No-Insurance and 90% CFWFI
Ratio of
Ratio of Ratio of
Ratio of
Expected
CER in
CER in
CER in
Indemnity
Optimal Restricted
90%CFWFI
in Optimal
CAWFI to CAWFI to
to No
CAWFI to
No
No
Program
90%
Program Program
CFWFI

Ratio of
Expected
Indemnity
in
Restricted
CAWFI
to 90%
CFWFI

State

Crop Mix

Kansas

Equal Acres

1.15

1.17

1.07

3.41

0.39

Corn Major

1.18

1.19

1.08

4.09

0.34

Wheat Major

1.15

1.17

1.08

4.41

0.44

North Dakota Equal Acres

1.10

1.11

1.05

4.40

0.45

Corn Major

1.15

1.16

1.07

4.43

0.40

Wheat Major

1.07

1.09

1.04

4.66

0.48

Equal Acres

1.03

1.06

1.02

5.67

0.52

Corn Major

1.04

1.07

1.03

6.48

0.59

Soybean Major

1.01

1.04

1.01

7.07

0.44

Equal Acres

1.09

1.15

1.03

4.20

0.14

Corn Major

1.09

1.13

1.03

4.76

0.15

Soybean Major

1.11

1.18

1.04

Illinois

Mississippi

4.06
0.13
Note: Scale and Coverage Level for Optimal and Restricted CAWFI are in table 6

The optimal CAWFI produces greater certainty equivalent revenue compared
with no-insurance program in multi-crop revenue context, too. It produces 4% more
certainty equivalent revenue in the soybean major farm in Illinois to 19% more in the
corn major farm in Kansas. Not only that, even restricted CAWFI is producing 1% to 8%
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more certainty equivalent revenue as compared with no-insurance program. These results
show that CAWFI is a workable insurance product for multiple crop area revenue
contexts, too.
The interesting result in multiple crop contexts is that optimal CAWFI
outperforms 90% CFWFI in each state for all crop mixes. The gap is very narrow for all
crop mixes in Kansas and North Dakota, i.e., 1% to 2% more, while it is wider in Illinois
and Mississippi. In the equal acres farm in Mississippi, optimal CAWFI exceeds 90%
CFWFI by 6% and by7% in the soybean major farm in Mississippi. This result shows that
appropriate weight, optimal scale, and optimal coverage level assigned to CAWFI would
be able to minimize basis risk equally as a farm-level product while estimating the multicrop area revenue context.
However, the optimal CAWFI produces higher certainty equivalent revenue, the
expected indemnity pay outs for this product is at least three fold to more than seven fold
across states and farm types. The expected indemnities in optimal CAWFI are more than
three fold in the equal acres farm in Kansas to more than seven fold in the soybean major
farm in Illinois. To protect the farm revenue as equally with the 90% CFWFI, farmers
with optimal CAWFI would have to pay at least three times the premium; this may go
more than seven folds. The gap of expected indemnity is wider between optimal CAWFI
and 90% CFWFI. It should be noted that these are actuarially fair premium rates. The
higher transaction cost in CFWFI as compared with CAWFI may narrow this gap which
is beyond this study.
The restricted CAWFI pays the lowest expected indemnity among these three
models. The restricted CAWFI pays only 13% to 15% of 90% CFWFI’s expected
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indemnity in different crop mixes in Mississippi, which is the lowest among all the states
and farm types:34% to 44% of 90% CFWFI in Kansas, 40% to 48% of 90% CFWFI in
North Dakota, and 44% to 59% of 90% CFWFI in Illinois.

Sensitivity Test on Optimal CAWFI Model

In this study, the analysis assumed all farmers were moderately risk-averse;
however, all decision makers may not be moderately risk averse. Another assumption is
that the revenue share of a crop on the farm is an appropriate weight, which seems logical
but has not been proven yet. Therefore, sensitivity tests were conducted for these two
assumptions.

Test on Weight of Optimal CAWFI Model
The revenue share of crops on the farm was used as an appropriate weight in
CAWFI. In this case, CAWFI also used acres as a weight. The results are in Table 15.
The optimal scale in using acreage share as a weight was obtained and is slightly higher
than the optimal scale from revenue share as a weight. The optimal coverage levels for
those respective scales in acreage share as a weight are at least equal or greater than the
optimal coverage levels in revenue share as a weight. The certainty equivalents under
both scenarios were compared.
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Table 15
Effects of Weights in Optimal as well as Restricted CAWFI Model
Kansas North Dakota Illinois Mississippi
50:50
50:50
50:50
Acreage share of Crops in Farm 50:50
Optimal
CAWFI
Acreage Share as
a weight
Restricted
CAWFI

Scale

2.39

2.33

1.58

2.81

Coverage Level

1.35

1.35

1.2

1.2

Scale

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

Coverage Level

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.9

75:25

65:35

62:38

65:35

Scale

2.02

1.98

1.29

2.4

Coverage Level

1.25

1.35

1.2

1.2

Scale

1.5

1.5

1.29

1.5

Coverage Level

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.9

1.0014

1.0002

1.0028

1.0060

Revenue Share of Crops in Farm

Revenue Share as
a Weight

Optimal
CAWFI

Restricted
CAWFI

CER Ratio of Acreage share Optimal CAWFI to
Revenue share Optimal CAWFI
CER Ratio of Acreage Share Restricted CAWFI to
Revenue Share Restricted CAWFI

0.9998

0.9971 0.9981

0.9974

Note: ratios are obtained from their respective certainty equivalent revenues (CER)

The acreage share as a weight in CAWFI has increased the optimal scale for all
regions in equally distributed crop acres in the farm. Moving toward the acreage weight
instead of revenue weight, higher weights are imposed to lower value of crops in each
state. For example, in Kansas, the revenue share of crops is 75:25 ratio where assigning
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equal 50:50 weights to each crop in acreage share as a weight increases imposes the
higher weights to lower value crop. This might be one of the possible reasons that could
have pushed optimal scale up in acreage share as a weight in CAWFI.
The optimal CAWFI with acreage share as a weight has produced a slightly
higher certainty equivalent revenue as compared with the optimal CAWFI with revenue
share as a weight in equally distributed acres of crops in the farm in all states. However,
the difference is so small (less than 0.60%) that it does not alter the CAWFI’s
performance over no-insurance program or 90% CFWFI. The restricted CAWFI with
acreage share as a weight was compared with restricted CAWFI with revenue share as a
weight in the equally distributed acres of crops in the farm across four states. Using
acreage share as a weight has reduced CAWFI’s performance slightly as compared with
revenue share as a weight in the restricted model though the difference is slim. It
confirms that the revenue share of crops in the multiple crops farm can also provide
better weight to the optimal CAWFI as equally as with acreage share as a weight while in
restricted the CAWFI case, the revenue share might be considered a better weighting
mechanism. Therefore, farmers can use acreage share or revenue share as a weight in
optimal CAWFI.

Test on Risk Aversion Coefficient of Optimal CAWFI Model
For the optimal CAWFI, other things remaining constant, the risk-aversion
coefficient was varied and the certainty equivalent revenue was estimated for the optimal
CAWFI along with no-insurance program and CFWFI. The expected indemnity pay outs
in optimal CAWFI and 90% CFWFI at risk-aversion Levels 1 and 3 were also estimated.
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The results are in Table 16. In the relative ratio of optimal CAWFI over no-insurance
program, CFWFI was compared at two different risk-aversion levels. The reason of doing
this is to observe whether CAWFI results vary across risk aversion coefficients or not.

Table 16
Effect of Risk Aversion Coefficient on Optimal CAWFI Model

Optimal
Scale

Optimal
Coverage
Level at
Risk
Aversion 1

Optimal
Coverage
Level at
Risk
Aversion 2

Optimal
Coverage
Level at
Risk
Aversion 3

Ratio of
CER at r=1
to CER at
r=3 in
Optimal
CAWFI

Kansas

2.02

1.25

1.25

1.35

1.0707

North Dakota

1.98

1.3

1.35

1.35

1.0570

Illinois

1.29

1.2

1.2

1.25

1.0107

Mississippi

2.4

1.2

1.2

1.25

1.0385

This test was conducted in equally distributed acres of crops in multiple crop
farming in Kansas, North Dakota, Illinois, and Mississippi. In this study, the effort was to
observe the effects of risk-aversion levels on optimal-coverage levels of the model. In
Kansas, Illinois, and Mississippi, optimal coverage levels have not changed while moving
from risk-aversion coefficient 1 to 2but have increased by 5% while moving from riskaversion coefficient 2 to 3. In North Dakota, optimal coverage level increased by 5%
while moving from risk-aversion coefficient 1 to 2 but remained the same while moving
from risk-aversion coefficient 2 to 3. Because of the change in risk-aversion coefficient
from 1 to 3, the optimal coverage level of the model has increased by 5% in each state.
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This may conclude that moving from moderately risk-averse to highly risk-averse
decision makers, optimal CAWFI’s coverage level may change.
The certainty equivalent revenue of optimal CAWFI based on the optimal scale
and optimal coverage level for risk-aversion coefficients 1 and 3 was estimated and are
presented in relative ratio in the last column of Table 16. The ratios are deviating from
1% in the Illinois farm to 7% in Kansas farm. These deviations are so small that they
would not alter the results.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

The concept of GRP was extended to single as well as multiple crops revenue
context in this study, and a CAWFI model was designed. This model was tested on
representative farms in four states, Kansas, North Dakota, Illinois, and Mississippi,
producing three crops, corn, wheat and soybean. The selection of revenue percentage of
crop in the farm as an appropriate weighting mechanism was an important effort to
customize area revenue into farm revenue, minimizing basis risk exposure on the CAWFI
model.
This study searched for the optimal scale and optimal coverage level and designed
an optimal CAWFI model. In optimal CAWFI, farmers are allowed to optimize their
revenue, choosing scale and coverage levels as needed. The optimal scales in most of the
crops in single crop contexts are beyond the GRP maximum scale 1.50 and coverage
levels are beyond 100%. A similar story can be found in multiple crops contexts where
scale is greater than 1.50 in many crop mixes and coverage levels are greater than 100%
for all crop mixes in all states. Both restricted and optimal CAWFI outperforms noinsurance programs, suggesting that CAWFI is a workable insurance product.
Imposing restriction on scale as per GRP provision and also on coverage level, a
restricted CAWFI was designed. A farm-level product CFWFI at 90% coverage level was
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also estimated. That the certainty equivalent in restricted CAWFI is lower than optimal
CAWFI in all crops and crop mixes across states suggests that relaxing the restriction on
CAWFI can increase farmers expected utility. In the single crop context, optimal CAWFI
produces a higher certainty equivalent than CFWFI in most of the crops across states. In
multiple crop contexts, optimal CAWFI is able to produce a higher certainty equivalent
over CFWFI in all four states for all crop mixes. This may show that optimal CAWFI
minimizes basis risk equally with currently available CFWFI.
However, expected indemnity pay outs for optimal CAWFI are from more than
three fold to more than seven fold as compared with CFWFI in multiple crop contexts,
and from more than four fold to more than seven fold in single crop contexts, depending
on geographical regions and crops as well as crop mixes. Farmers have to pay three to
seven times more premiums in optimal CAWFI to obtain the same level of risk protection
as in CFWFI.
Finally, the sensitivity test confirms that varying risk-aversion coefficients in
optimal CAWFI or considering acreage share as an appropriate weight would not change
the decisions.
In this study, the assumption of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function of wealth has been made to estimate expected utility. The CRRA utility function
may not hold all the time for all the decision makers. There might be some exceptions
where decision makers may show increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) utility
function where expected utility increases as the amount of initial wealth. In the same
way, there might be some cases where decision makers may show decreasing relative risk
aversion (DRRA) utility function over wealth where expected utility decreases as the
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amount of initial wealth increases. Therefore, further work in this model taking some
other utility function except CRRA would be recommended to show robustness of the
CAWFI for under all types of utility functions.
In addition to this, the CAWFI model was tested only in four geographical regions
in three major field crops. This study can be extended to more regions covering many
crops to generalize the results. In this study, whole farm insurance based on farm-level
yield has been considered as a baseline model to compare with optimal CAWFI. This
study can also be extended to compare this optimal CAWFI model with commodityspecific revenue coverage products like Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) because in this
study, whole farm insurance based on farm-level yield was taken as a baseline to
compare with CAWFI.
In practice, insurance products are offered with farm programs like ACRE and
SURE, which were not in this study. This study can also be extended, considering all of
those farm support as well as price/income support programs together with optimal
CAWFI, which may assist in determining the overlapping effects of optimal CAWFI with
farm-support programs.
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